

















the	 transparency	and	 the	public	acceptance	of	policy.	The	paper	considers	 the	continuum	of	
possibilities	 for	 including	 the	 public	 from	 the	 gratuitous	 exploitation	 of	 the	 public	 voice	 by	
populists	 and	media	entrepreneurs	using	 top‐of‐the‐head	opinion	polls	 through	 to	 informed	
public	opinion,	public	consultation	process	and	ultimately	 the	democratisation	of	sentencing	
policy.	It	is	argued	that	this	continuum	can	be	seen	as	reflecting	both	the	amount	of	true	power	
given	to	the	public	voice	as	well	as	 the	amount	of	respect	given	to	public	 input.	Much	of	 the	
fear	of	public	inclusion	in	elite	circles	concerns	public	opinion	as	depicted	in	the	media	which	










public	 and	 politicians	 alike.	 Although	 there	 are	 many	 problems	 with	 the	 concept,	 as	 will	 be	
discussed	below,	it	is	important	at	the	outset	to	note	the	deep	resonance	of	the	issue.	Why	does	
it	 resound	 so	 deeply?	 One	 reason	 may	 be	 that	 it	 reflects	 an	 even	 greater	 crisis	 of	 trust	 in	
government	and	our	public	 institutions.	The	charge	 that	 the	courts	are	 ‘out	of	step’	may	sting	
because	 it	 has	 become	 a	 social	 and	 political	 fact,	 notwithstanding	 the	 widespread	 lack	 of	
knowledge	about	the	courts.	The	reality	for	most	is	that	the	courts	don’t	look	like	a	responsive,	
transparent	or	accountable	organisation.	This	may	well	be	because	 these	characteristics	were	
never	 seen	 as	 vital	 performance	 indicators	 for	 courts.	 They	 were,	 in	 previous	 times,	 more	
concerned	with	exhibiting	their	insularity	along	with,	or	supported	by,	the	sober	and	elite	status	
they	 enjoyed.	 But	 times	 have	 changed	 and	 the	 crisis	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 courts	 is	 perhaps	










the	 operation	 of	 the	 courts	 are	 developed.	 Conventional	 mechanisms	 that	 provide	 for	 the	
development	of	policy	by	the	elite	effectively	block	out	the	public	from	a	serious	role	in	policy	
formation.	 However	 in	 systematically	 blocking	 the	 public	 out	 of	 formal	 channels,	 the	 public	
‘voice’,	 at	 least	 as	 it	 is	 perceived	 and	 conceptualised	 by	 some	 actors,	 may	 exercise	 an	 even	
greater	influence.	Ironically	that	influence	may	further	distance	the	real	‘voice’	of	the	public.	The	
‘public	 opinion’	 that	 is	 being	 taken	 on	 board	 by	 populists	 is	 a	 kind	 of	media	 dominated	 and	
reactionary	caricature	and	bears	little	relation	to	more	considered	public	judgment.	It	is	argued	





The	 paper	 begins	 with	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 informed	 public	 opinion	 and	 the	
contribution	that	‘deliberation’	makes	to	attitudes	to	sentencing.	It	will	be	argued	that	the	way	












and	 positions	 adopted	 by	 a	 member	 of	 the	 public	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 question	 are	 invariably	 a	
reflection	of	 some	embedded	assumptions	 contained	within	 an	ongoing	discourse	around	 the	
topic.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 questions	 relate	 to	 gun	 control,	 the	 death	 penalty	 or	 mandatory	
sentencing,	they	invite	the	statement	of	the	respondent’s	position	based	on	what	has	already	be	
gleaned	 about	 debate	 contained	 in	 the	 news	 media.	 Essentially	 the	 poll	 is	 asking	 about	 the	
respondent’s	 alignment	 with	 established	 socio‐political	 interests.	 Presenting	 this	 as	 simple	
‘opinion’	 without	 acknowledging	 predictable	 factors	 conditioning	 the	 response	 is	 either	
misleading	 or	 misinformed.	 However,	 the	 ‘top‐of‐the‐head’	 response	 will	 continue	 to	 be	
interesting	to	many.	This	is	not	necessarily	a	problem	as	long	as	there	is	a	clear	appreciation	of	




Emotions	 of	 fear,	 anger	 and	 disgust	 are	 certainly	 easy	 to	 elicit	 on	 topics	 of	 crime	 and	
punishment2.	 However,	 to	 reduce	 public	 input	 to	 that	 of	 emotional	 reaction	 denies	 the	
legitimate	 and	 more	 pragmatic	 public	 interest	 in	 policy.	 Doob	 (2000)	 found	 that	 when	
conditions	 for	 rational	 problem	 solving	 are	 established	 it	 is	 the	 utilitarian	 aims	 that	
predominate.	So	the	problem	or	obstacle	for	including	the	public	voice	into	the	development	of	
policy	is	not	with	the	public	but	with	the	way	the	public	is	engaged.	When	engaged	as	decision	


















from	 policy.	 The	 top–of‐the‐head	 polls	 serve	 to	 keep	 the	 focus	 on	 expressive	 aspects	 of	
sentencing	because	they	invite	and	reflect	personal	values	or	emotions.	Such	a	focus	is	cued	to	
respondents	by	the	general,	and	often	directly	emotional,	nature	of	the	questions.	This	focusing	
on	 values	 and	 emotions	 plays	 directly	 into	 the	 central	 and	 pervading	 concerns	 of	 morality,	
responsibility	 and	 social	 defence.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	 crime	 is	 such	 an	 effective	 target	 for	






Crime	 control	 is	 not	 interesting	 to	 populists	 because	 of	 a	 realistic	 threat	 of	 victimisation	 but	
rather	 because	 crime	 represents	 par	 excellence	 a	 range	 of	 other	 breakdowns	 in	 social	





continuing	 to	 focus	 only	 on	 the	 emotional	 or	 expressive	 dimensions	 of	 the	 punishment	
response,	media	and	political	entrepreneurs	are	able	to	exploit	‘the	voice	of	the	people’	for	their	
purposes.	 This	 is	 fundamentally	 disrespectful	 of	 the	 public	 and	 dismisses	 it	 as	 a	 viable	 force	
within	policy	development.	The	‘public’	as	an	entity	is	reduced	to	a	repository	of	raw	emotion.	
For	 this	 to	 change,	 the	 public	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	 ‘informed’	 or	 ‘educated’;	 rather,	 the	







‘word	 association	 test’	 to	 one	where	 the	 inquiry	 is	 focused	 on	what	 the	 view	 or	 judgment	 is	
when	the	respondent	has	some	knowledge	of	the	question	at	hand.	But	the	notion	of	informed	
public	opinion	generally	conveys	more	than	just	knowledge	or	 ‘information’.	Price	and	Neijins	
(1998)	 argue	 that	 there	 are	 three	 elements	 of	 the	 construct:	 information;	 deliberation;	 and	
responsibility‐taking.	 It	 is	 significant	 that	 two	 of	 Price	 and	 Neijins’	 criteria	 do	 not	 concern	
information	 but	 rather	 the	 orientation	 of	 the	 respondent	 to	 the	 task.	 These	 authors	 see	 the	
processing	 of	 the	 information	 through	question,	 debate	 and	 consideration	 as	 constituting	 the	




views	 and	 responses	 to	 specific	 issues.	 These	 include	 planning	 cells,	 deliberative	 polling,	











of‐the‐head	 opinion	 reflected	 in	 the	 polls	we	 often	 see	 in	 newspapers;	 and	 second,	 the	 other	
deeply	 considered	 judgment	 contained	 within	 certain	 parameters	 and	 guided	 by	 elaborate	
‘rules’	of	evidence	and	the	like.	Naturally	these	serve	very	different	purposes	but	they	reflect	in	
some	 degree	 the	 evolution	 of	 our	 thinking	 about	 public	 attitude,	 from	 being	 just	 lightly	 held	
opinion	to	considered	judgment.	This	distinction	has	actually	been	appreciated	for	a	long	time	
but	has	yet	 to	become	widely	accepted	or	 incorporated	 into	policy	 formation	mechanisms.	 In	





distinguishes	 what	 Habermas	 calls	 ‘mere	 opinion’	 from	 its	 alternative:	 considered	 judgment.	
The	process	 is	elevated	by	the	requirement	that	the	respondent	needs	to	weigh	up	competing	
goals,	sensitivities	and	constraints	to	arrive	at	a	responsible	decision.	Studies	of	public	attitudes	
have	 found	 this	 to	 be	 a	 crucial	 shift	 that	 informs	 and	 colours	 the	 outcome	 significantly.	 For	
example,	 Durham	 and	 colleagues	 (1996)	 found	 that	 support	 for	 the	 death	 penalty	 decreased	










unless	we	 accept	 the	 notion	 that	 crime	 policy	 should	 simply	 serve	 as	 a	means	 for	 the	 public	




only	 to	 provide	 greater	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 courts	 but	 also	 to	 protect	 them	 from	 political	
exploitation.	The	possibility	of	shutting	out	the	public	voice	or	placating	it	seems	to	be	the	least	
effective	as	well	as	the	least	creative	way	of	responding	to	the	crisis	of	confidence	in	the	courts.	



















In	 considering	 the	 role	 of	 the	 public	 in	 the	 reform	 of	 crime	 policy,	 Dzur	 (2012)	 argued	 that	
political	and	legal	theorists	have	offered	two	diametrically	opposed	responses.	On	the	one	hand,	
he	argued,	are	the	 insulations	who	seek	to	 isolate	and	protect	special	and	sensitive	aspects	of	
the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 such	 as	 sentencing	 from	 the	 vague	 and	 fierce	 winds	 of	 public	
influence.	This	position	is	reflected	in	the	suggestions	by	some	in	this	area	(for	example,	Roberts	
et	al.	2003)	for	the	development	of	‘institutional	buffers’	such	as	Sentencing	Advisory	Councils.	





far,	 the	 alternative	has	 been	 characterized	 as	 the	 status	quo	 condition	of	 penal	
populism,	but	this	is	not	the	only	available	choice.	(Dzur	2012:	118)		
	
The	contrasting	position	 is	 that,	 rather	 than	deflect	public	 influence,	we	should	systematically	
and	 effectively	 embrace	 it.	 The	 alternative,	 according	 to	 Dzur,	 is	 the	 ‘integrationist’	 position	
reflected	in	the	work	of	John	Braithwaite,	Nils	Christie	and	Howard	Zehr.	Dzur	argues	it	 is	the	












As	 noted	 above,	 the	 alternative	ways	 of	 viewing	 attempts	 by	 authorities	 to	 situate	 the	public	
voice	can	be	placed	on	a	continuum	from	the	gratuitous	and	exploitative	(populism)	to	detailed,	
genuine	 and	 considerate.	 This	 continuum	 has	 been	 described	 in	 detail	 in	 an	 earlier	 work	
(Indermaur	2008).	Dzur’s	binary	distinction	between	 insulationists	and	 integrationists	can	be	
seen	 as	 looking	 at	 the	 two	 points	 on	 this	 continuum.	 Once	 we	 see	 how	 the	 struggle	 to	
incorporate	 and	 respond	 to	 public	 opinion	 falls	 on	 a	 continuum,	 we	 can	 begin	 to	 see	 the	
underlying	domain	reflected	in	the	continuum.	It	could	be	summarised	as	 ‘power’	–	the	actual	
power,	reflected	in	respect	given	to	the	public	voice.	This	essential	property	of	the	continuum	
could	be	 seen	as	 somewhat	akin	 to	 the	concept	of	 ‘dominion’	within	 the	 republican	 theory	of	
justice		
	
The	 integrationist	 approach	 is	 obviously	 consistent	 with	 the	 attempt	 to	 enhance	 public	
engagement	in	sentencing	policy.	It	aligns	with	the	movement	away	from	the	simple	tapping	of	
top‐of‐the‐head	 opinions	 and	 towards	 placing	 the	 public	 in	 a	 position	 of	 respect	 and	





seek	 more	 information	 when	 a	 group	 of	 the	 public	 are	 invited	 to	 have	 a	 role	 with	 some	
responsibility	 to	 establish	 parameters	 for	 sentencing	 policy,	 they	 need	 to	 be	 engaged	 in	 an	
interactive	way	when	it	comes	to	information5.		
	







earlier	 attempts	 were	misinformed	 and	 dangerous.	 For	 example,	 the	 idea	 of	 including	 a	 one	
sentence	 question	 as	 a	 referendum	 at	 the	 national	 election	 in	 New	 Zealand	 provided	 broad	
authority	 for	 the	 most	 draconian	 sentencing	 measures.	 Further,	 the	 enthusiasm	 amongst	





quickly.	 Ideally	 these	 attempts	 to	 engage	 the	 public	 should	 be	 theoretically	 grounded	 and	
inspired.	 This	 would	mean	 that,	 rather	 than	 consultation	 ‘add‐ons’	 to	 an	 already	 established	
policy	 formulation	 process,	 the	 public	 input	 becomes	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 the	 process.	 The	
guiding	principles	of	democratisation	would	 then	replace	 the	existing	mantra	of	 ‘consultation’	
and	 the	 inherent	 understanding	 that	 it	 is	 an	 expendable	 side	 dish.	 We	 have	 seen	 various	
attempts	at	a	consultative	process	emerging	in	England	and	Wales	following	(and	including)	the	
Home	Office	(2001)	review	of	sentencing	(the	Halliday	Report).	However	these	attempts	have	





Despite	 the	 stilted,	 patchy	 and	 limited	 attempts	 to	 include	 the	 public	 voice	 in	 the	 area	 of	
criminal	justice	policy,	democratisation	is	well	under	way	in	other	areas	social	policy7.	Dzur	and	
Mirchandani	 (2007)	see	 the	democratisation	process	as	occurring	 through	the	escalation	–	or	
rather	the	introduction	–	of	a	greater	sense	of	public	participation	and	dialogue.	These	authors	
point	to	the	restorative	 justice	movement	and	the	supporting	republican	theories	of	 justice	as	







The	 issue	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 courts	 needs	 to	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 larger	 context	 of	 changing	




and	 accountability.	 These	 expectations	 spread	 to	 the	 courts	 themselves,	 their	 actions	 (the	
sentencing)	and	the	policy	that	underpins	sentencing.	We	find	old	assumptions	that	elites	are	to	
be	respected	as	a	kind	of	benign	and	knowing	repository	of	wisdom	on	matters	concerning	the	
law	 are	 no	 longer	 sufficient.	 Sentencing	 policy,	 perhaps	 one	 of	 the	most	 vital	 and	 expressive	
forms	of	government	policy,	appears	 to	be	at	 the	 frontline	 for	criticism	but	reform	of	 the	way	
sentencing	 policy	 is	 formulated	 appears	 to	 be	 lagging	 well	 behind	 what	 is	 required.	 In	 her	
penetrating	 analysis	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 public	 confidence	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 and	 the	
surrounding	discourses,	Turner	(2008)	argues	that	the	concept	of	confidence	needs	to	be	more	
thoroughly	examined	and	a	clearer	emphasis	put	on	meaningful	engagement.	Turner	makes	the	













of	 the	 attempts	 to	 include	 the	 public	 in	 criminal	 justice	 policy	 making	 thus	 far	 appear	 half	
hearted.	As	 Johnstone	(2000)	notes,	many	of	 the	vaunted	public	consultations	appear	 to	have	
been	largely	designed	simply	to	placate	the	public.		
	





of	 the	 formal	 reviews	 of	 sentencing	 conducted	 in	 most	 western	 democracies	 over	 the	 past	
quarter	 century.	 However,	 these	 have	 rarely	 systematically	 tapped	 public	 preferences.	
Following	on	from	the	general	level,	there	could	be	an	inquiry	into	managing	different	types	of	
sentencing	 dilemmas.	 An	 interesting	 challenge	 is	 to	 genuinely	 inquire	 how	 sense	 is	 made	 of	
different	 offence/offender	 combinations.	We	 know	 from	various	 research	 into	 public	 opinion	
(for	example,	Rex	2002)	that	the	public	think	in	terms	of	offence/offender	combinations.	One	of	
the	possibilities	 is	 to	explore	how	public	conceptualisations	might	be	translated	 into	different	




What	 is	 impractical	 and	 unnecessary	 in	 regard	 to	 public	 engagement	 is	 for	 the	 public	 to	 be	
engaged	 in	operational	and	administrative	matters.	 It	 is	at	 the	 level	of	overarching	policy	and	
direction	that	public	engagement	is	not	only	most	meaningful	but	ultimately	(for	the	public	and	






public’,	 the	 ordinary	 everyday	 citizen	 that	 does	 not	 have	 a	 particular	 axe	 to	 grind	 but	 is	
concerned	with	the	things	most	citizens	can	be	thought	to	be	concerned	with	–	public	safety	and	
the	 integrity	 and	 fairness	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 What	 we	 are	 seeking	 here	 is	 the	
recruitment	and	engagement	of	a	representative	sample	which	would	be	willing	to	become	at	




wishes	 concerning	 sentencing	 The	 debating	 process	 also	 tests	 out	 how	 public	 views	 can	
respond	and	change	with	the	addition	of	information	–	like	the	technical	likelihood	of	changing	
behaviour,	 producing	more	 public	 safety,	 the	 relative	 costs	 of	 certain	 proposals	 and	 perhaps	
some	 of	 the	 unanticipated	 consequences.	 The	 process	 parallels	 the	 ‘public	 sphere’	 processes	
introduced	and	discussed	by	Habermas.	As	Dzur	and	Mirchandani	(2007:	161)	summarise:		
	
...	 public	 sphere	 process	 involve[s]	 individuals	who	 interact	 equally	 in	 rational,	
open	and	ongoing	debate	to	discuss	and	ultimately	agree	upon	public	policies	like	












developed	 in	 policy	 bureaux	 and	ultimately	 integrated	 in	 a	 practical	way	 into	 legislation	 that	
governs	sentencing	practice.		
	
Creating	 a	 context	 of	 decision	 making	 whereby	 the	 responsibility	 for	 policy	 rests	 with	 the	
individual	 will	 likely	 reduce	 many	 participants’	 tendency	 to	 base	 their	 responses	 on	 pure	




is	 not	 information	 but	 the	 role	 we	 expect	 the	 respondent	 to	 play	 and	 how	 we	 convey	 that	
expectation	 through	 how	 the	 respondent	 is	 approached.	 Indermaur	 and	 colleagues	 (2012)	
concluded	 from	 their	 analysis	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 information	 and	 deliberation	 on	 short	 form	
opinion	surveys	that,	rather	than	the	technical	information,	it	was	the	changed	task	demands	or	
postures	that	made	the	difference	in	terms	of	reduced	punitiveness	and	increased	openness	to	





There	 is	 considerable	 experience	 on	 how	 to	 provide	 for	 public	 participation	 in	 developing	
policy,	including	complex	areas	of	social	policy9.	This	points	to	the	necessity	of	a	multi‐layered	
strategy	 where	 policy	 questions	 are	 carefully	 formulated	 prior	 to	 any	 attempt	 at	 formally	
engaging	 the	 public.	 In	 the	 preparation	 stage,	 components	 or	 aspects	 of	 sentencing	 policy,	
where	 it	 is	valuable	 to	obtain	public	 input,	need	to	be	 identified	by	a	suitably	qualified	group	
and	then	questions	developed	where	public	preferences	or	responses	are	relevant.	This	 initial	
stage	 could	 involve	 key	 groups	 of	 stakeholders,	 as	 has	 been	 the	 practice	 elsewhere,	 to	 help	
frame	relevant	questions	for	the	public	debate	(see	Renn	et	al.	1993).	This	stage	also	 involves	
developing	a	range	of	policy	positions	and	questions.	Policy	options	need	to	be	formulated	and	





by	 a	 suitably	 qualified	 and	 independent	 body	 has	 significant	 advantages.	 Thus	 far	 the	 most	




from	 current	 governments.	 The	 ideal	 authority	 exists	 in	 some	 jurisdictions	 in	 the	 form	 of	
Sentencing	 Advisory	 Councils.	 Indeed,	 as	 noted	 earlier,	 the	 Sentencing	 Advisory	 Panel	 in	
England	and	Wales	 conducted	a	number	of	 specific	 and	detailed	 inquiries	 into	public	opinion	
regarding	 some	 difficult	 sentencing	 policy	 dilemmas.	 In	 Australia,	 the	 Victorian	 Sentencing	
Advisory	Council	has	conducted	a	series	of	inquiries	and	sponsored	research	into	public	opinion	






There	 may	 be	 a	 belief	 amongst	 some	 in	 the	 judiciary	 and	 academia	 that	 sentencing	 is	 too	
important	 to	 be	 entrusted	 to	 the	 public	 but	 this	 position	 (insulationism	 in	 Dzur’s	 analysis)	













This	 paper	 began	 with	 the	 question	 of	 why	 the	 issue	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 courts	 is	 widely	
recognised	as	one	that	should	be	addressed	and	needs	to	be	addressed.	The	key	argument	here	
is	that	the	issue	pertains	to	the	ever	growing	lack	of	legitimacy	of	the	courts.	This	is	not	because	
the	 courts	 are	 doing	 anything	 differently	 or	 that	 they	 have	 failed	 to	 adhere	 to	 their	 own	
expectations.	Rather	 it	 is	because	the	policy	that	governs	the	courts	and	that	the	courts	enact,	






The	 value	 of	 public	 engagement	 is	 principally	 to	 add	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 courts.	 However	 the	
process	of	public	engagement	will	do	more.	It	will	add	value	to	the	communicative	functions	of	





away	 from	the	 judiciary.	 Indeed	this	 form	of	engagement	adds	 legitimacy	while	strengthening	
the	 process	 and	 ultimately	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 courts.	 A	 corresponding	 form	 of	 public	








1	 A	 number	 of	 authoritative	 sources	 provide	 detail	 on	 the	 picture	 of	 public	 opinion,	 the	 media	 and	 sentencing	





(2009)	 for	 a	 review	of	 the	 role	of	 anger	 in	public	 attitudes.	 See	 Sargent	 (2004)	 for	 an	 examination	about	how	
individual	 preferences	 to	 use	 emotion	 in	 understanding	 behaviour	 can	 predict	 punitiveneness	 and	 Frieberg	





longer	holds	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	or	 the	United	States	namely	 trust	 in	experts	and	professionals	 in	 criminal	
justice’	 (p.	117).	Second,	Dzur	argues	 that	 the	 idea	of	 true	 independence	 is	questionable	as	 the	selection	of	 the	


















(2000),	Shand	and	Arnberg	 (1996),	Bishop	and	Davis	 (2002),	Hendricks	 (2002),	Einsiedel	and	Eastlick	 (2000),	
Pratchett	(1999);	Fischer	(1993),	Carpini	et	al.	(2004)	and	Rowe	and	Frewer	(2005).	
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